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Resumen 
 
After almost 20 years of prudent macro policies, Peru seems in better shape than before to withstand the 
effects of a financial crisis. Progress, however, has left some policy areas unscathed and the labor market 
is one of them. In this paper we analyze the potential effects of the crisis on labor market outcomes, and 
discuss policy options to address short run and structural considerations. We review stylized facts from 
this and previous crisis to account for potential transmission mechanisms, review policy options and 
results from past and existing labor market interventions, and build a DSGE model to provide further 
insight regarding labor market outcomes and the effects of transitory and permanent policy measures. On 
the countercyclical front, our analysis reveals that the main risk that the policymaker should aim to 
mitigate is a surge in informality and underemployment. For this, job protection alternatives (as 
temporary payroll tax holidays already implemented) have to be accompanied by a strengthened and 
better focalized reemployment service, especially if the shock transpires into the non-tradable sector. On 
the more structural side, policy should aim at the prime drivers of informality in our country: low 
productivity and high formal labor costs. For the latter, progressive access to labor benefits for small 
firms (already introduced via a special labor regime) could be complemented by introducing different 
minimum wage levels according to firm size and a generalized reduction in firing costs. Low productivity 
issues, on the other hand, can be addressed by strengthening and integrating existing training programs 
and information networks which have already proven successful in terms of formal job creation. 
Simulations reveal that permanent non-wage cost reductions (like those introduced via the special labor 
regime) can increase formal employment and formal GDP participation by 2 percentage points. 
Structural policy interventions also exhibit a large countercyclical potential due to their permanent nature. 
This implies that we should not wait for the crisis to be over to start their implementation.. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
 
Before the global crisis hit the Peruvian economy, the common wisdom was that Peru 
will be able to forestall it in much better shape than before. The basis for that 
widespread belief was the recent progress in terms of macroeconomic policy outcomes.  
GDP per capita has increased –in real terms- by 44.5 percent in the last decade. Poverty 
rates have come down from 48.6 percent in 2004 to 36.2 percent in 2008.  
 
Peru has achieved monetary stability and is much better prepared to withstand foreign 
shocks with an amount of foreign reserves that is equivalent to more than 25 percent of 
GDP, compared to Chile that has 14 percent or Brazil with 12 percent. Twenty years 
before, the Peruvian economy escaped out of a hyperinflation process with persistent 
and more disciplined monetary and fiscal policies, and with the unusual choice of a 
dirty floating exchange rate regime. The financial system endured several banking crisis 
in the 80s and 90s and now it looks fortified, after several mergers and with a larger 
share (12 out of 15) of foreign banks. Perhaps, the fact that depicts more clearly this 
change is that Peru now has investment grade for its sovereign debt after being a pariah 
in the international financial markets. Public external debt went from 70 percent of GDP 
in 1988 to only 15 percent in 2008. These remarkable outcomes have been the 
consequence of good policies, and also good luck. Prudent macroeconomic policies 
have been followed in the last twenty years under different administrations, and the 
recent surge in commodity prices has helped to consolidate much of the work of 
policymakers. 
 
However, progress has left some policy areas unscathed in the last decade. One of those 
is the labor market. The political willingness to reduce the rigidity of the labor market 
was gone by the end of the 90s. Only in the last years there was a timid attempt to 
modify this situation with the new small and medium enterprise law that offered a less 
costly labor regime. In that sense, it is valid to question if our labor market is ready to 
withstand a major external shock and if the tools to deal with a sudden drop in external 
demand will suffice, as the benefits of formal employment are in place only for half of 
the workforce according to the latest household survey (ENAHO 2008).  
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As usual, the crisis created an opportunity to suggest many action plans. Some are old 
(increase the minimum wage, income support programs, among others) and some are 
new (e.g. training targeted on the unemployed), some seem promising and others seem 
dangerous. For example, increasing the minimum wage might be an easy way to expand 
workers incomes but at the potential cost of increasing informality (Jaramillo, 2005). 
On the promising side, we have evidence supporting that demand driven training 
programs can have a significant impact on workers productivity (Díaz and Jaramillo 
(2006) and Yamada (2008a)). Moreover, policymakers face the trade off of solving 
current problems but creating more in the future, as some policy options could be too 
fiscally expensive in terms of how much is gained in jobs protected. The road of good 
intentions is filled with bad outcomes. 
 
In this paper, we address the impact of the global financial crisis in the Peruvian 
economy with a special focus on the labor market and we suggest how to evaluate 
different policy choices. For this, we start from the fact that the adequacy of alternative 
policy measures will depend on the policy objectives, the magnitude and duration of the 
external shock, and which sectors are most affected. Once we have identified the most 
relevant policy options, we also review the literature on past and existing interventions 
in order to avoid making the same mistakes, and to improve our policy 
recommendations. To help evaluate policy alternatives, we present a quantitative 
exercise based on a general equilibrium model. We believe this is the most appropriate 
approach since it will not only capture the most significant transmission mechanisms of 
the global crisis, but will also allow to simulate the effects of both transitory and 
permanent policy interventions. All this analysis will need to include the uncertainty 
about the pace of the global economy recovery, since it is still unclear if the world 
economy will go back to normal in a short period of time or if it will take longer to 
resume growing steadily.  
 
Our analysis does not focus on the standard countercyclical stimulus package that could 
be engineered combining fiscal and monetary policies. Since the wake of the crisis the 
Peruvian Central Bank has continuously cut down short term interest rates, and the 
Finance Ministry has launched a fiscal stimulus plan, and one could expect that these 
will exert an impact on the labor market. Their main transmission mechanism, however, 
can only be tracked down at the aggregate level via an expansion in domestic demand. 
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Instead, our objective is to focus on and assess the convenience of alternative policy 
interventions within the labor market, something that, in fact, has not been sufficiently 
addressed in the current countercyclical effort
1
.    
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the potential 
transmission mechanisms of the crisis, presenting some stylized facts to characterize 
how it is affecting the performance of the domestic economy and the labor market so 
far. In section 3, we present alternative policy objectives, describe policy options 
available, and discuss their adequacy under different crisis scenarios. In section 4, we 
present the main features and discuss the results of our model. Finally, in the last section 
we summarize the policy recommendations that stem from the analysis in section 3 and 
the quantitative scenarios portrayed in section 4. 
 
 
 
2. Potential transmission mechanisms and labor market 
outcomes: the stylized facts 
 
After posting a 9.8% annual growth rate in 2008, Peruvian real GDP grew only 1.8% in 
the first quarter of this year. While some argue that this is as low as it will get in terms 
of aggregate output growth, the truth is that the manufacturing sector has already been 
severely hit and its real output has dropped more than 5% during the first quarter of 
2009. Not surprisingly, during this same period, urban employment in this sector also 
fell by a figure close to 5%, while total urban employment annual growth fell from 
6.9% to 3.4% between the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of this year (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The 2009-2010 Economic Stimulus Plan has a total budget of  S/.12,561 million (3.2% of GDP). Only 
1.4% of its total budget has been allocated to policy interventions that can be regarded as directly focused 
on the labor market. 
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Figure 1: Urban employment growth in firms with 10 or more workers  
(annual percentage change of a 3-month rolling index) 
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      Source: Peruvian Central Bank and Labor Ministry. 
 
 
Using an alternative classification of the MINTRA data set we can have a clearer 
picture of which sectors have been the most affected by the external shock and the 
ongoing slowdown. In Figure 2 we plot the behavior of urban employment in five 
sectors of the economy. As expected, the manufacturing sector has taken the largest toll, 
followed by the extractive sector. Both sectors are the ones with tighter links to external 
demand. In fact, by September 2008, these were already growing below their 2008-2009 
average. Commerce, services, and transportation, which are more linked with domestic 
demand, have suffered a slowdown but not a contraction, and their response has taken 
more time to materialize (they are growing below their 2008-2009 average since 
January 2009). 
 
During the previous crisis (1998-2001), all five sectors experienced negative growth 
rates. By that time, the external shock triggered a domestic financial market crisis which 
affected aggregate investment and job creation rates throughout the economy. 
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Figure 2: Urban Employment  
Firms with 10 or more workers, annual growth rate 
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 Source: Labor Ministry (Informe Estadístico Mensual), INEI. 
 
The above symptoms are consistent with an external crisis which is hitting the economy 
mainly through a commercial channel. In fact, total exports exhibit a 32% drop in dollar 
terms if we compare the first quarters of 2008 and 2009
2
, while mining and textile 
exports report dramatic cutbacks of 35% and 27%, respectively. Terms of trade, on the 
other hand, have deteriorated more than 22% during the same period (see Figure 3). As 
consumption and investment flows drop in the rest of the world (and especially in the 
larger economies), external aggregate demand for our tradable goods falls and this 
translates into a reduction in their prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Most of this 32% drop is explained by a decline in prices (-28%). Quantities have only dropped 5% 
during this period. 
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Figure 3: Exports growth and terms of trade 
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      Source: Peruvian Central Bank. 
 
The way this transpires into the domestic economy can be summarized as follows: a 
reduction in external demand (which implies a reduction in both export prices and 
quantities), reduces the real return to labor in the tradable sector. As the demand for this 
factor drops, tradable output, employment and wages will be negatively affected. In the 
short run, wage rigidities and job protection legislation can slowdown this adjustment 
process. In Peru, however, these constraints can be easily bypassed switching to 
informal contracts. The ultimate consequence is the job post can be maintained but with 
less benefits for the worker. Moreover, and as will be analyzed later, underemployment 
(rather than unemployment) is the variable that grows during recessions.  
 
The exact combination in which employment and wages will adjust will depend on 
labor supply and demand elasticities, as well as on the presence of rigidities discussed 
above. In any case, real incomes of families supplying labor to the tradable sector will 
be negatively affected. In some cases, this will be the consequence of a wage cut, in 
others it will be the consequence of a transition to an underpaid job or unemployment. 
  
This income effect is one the main channels through which the initial shock can leak 
into the rest of the economy and its strength will depend, crucially, on the size of the 
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tradable sector. If a significant number of families are affected by wage cuts and/or job 
losses, consumption and investment flows will drop, aggregate demand will contract 
and this will end up hitting non-tradable output which, by definition, is determined by 
domestic demand.  
 
Together with the commercial channel summarized above, there is another potential 
mechanism which can end up hitting domestic consumption and investment, and this 
time more directly: the financial channel. In fact, this channel was the main 
transmission mechanism during the 1998-99 crisis. As international investors cutback 
savings flows, small open economies (emerging markets) are the first to get hit, mainly 
because of risk considerations. If the domestic financial sector is heavily dependant on 
these flows to finance private investment, a credit crunch could follow and domestic 
firms will be rationed. Under these circumstances, a flexible exchange rate could act as 
a shock absorber: it should raise, mitigate the effect on domestic interest rates and help 
close any external imbalances on the commercial front. In emerging markets, bad news 
in the rest of the (financial) world typically translate into large nominal exchange rate 
depreciations, and this price adjustment should help the domestic economy 
accommodate the scarcity of foreign funds.  
 
However, problems on the real side can arise with this adjustment mechanism if the 
domestic economy exhibits large currency mismatches in the balance sheet of either 
banks, firms, households or the government. Under these circumstances, and as 
described by the financial accelerator literature (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999), 
a large depreciation will increase the real burden of debt, reduce firms’ net worth and 
lead to an increase in interest rate risk premium. The latter will end up reducing 
investment flows, thus magnifying the real effect of the external shock and also making 
it more persistent. 
 
While the above was the prevailing story to account for the 1998-2001 recession, 
several stylized facts suggest that we now have a much stronger financial front. While it 
is true that foreign currency credit to the private sector has stopped growing due to the 
external turmoil, it is also true that total credit keeps growing although at a slower pace 
(20 percent in April 2009 instead of 30 percent in October 2008). Moreover, liability 
dollarization ratios have dropped more than 25 percentage points in the last 10 years 
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(from 80% in 1998 to 55% by the end of 2008) reducing the threat to the economy of a 
balance sheet effect. As in the 1998-99 crisis, short term capital flows have experienced 
an important downfall in the past months. However, foreign currency credit is now less 
dependent on volatile external short term liabilities (see Figure 4). Moreover, the ability 
of the Peruvian Central Bank to smooth out pressures on the exchange rate market has 
been an element that had helped to avoid larger problems in financial markets. The 
Peruvian exchange rate has fluctuated less than the rest of their Latin American 
counterparts. 
  
Figure 4: Short term capital flows (% GDP) and funding sources of foreign 
currency credit (1998-99 crisis vs. current scenario) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Peruvian Central Bank. 
 
 
An additional transmission mechanism of the crisis has to do with firms’ expectations 
about the future behavior of the economy. Investment decisions today are linked not 
only to the cost of financial funds but also to potential demand. Investment flows tend 
to be more volatile than consumption or GDP as they are more heavily influenced by 
the business cycle dynamics. When there is a boom in consumption, firms will phase in 
their process of buying imported inputs to have enough stocks to sustain the growing 
demand. If the expectations about the economy are shattered by any type of news or 
shock, investment flows will become smaller. If the reversal is drastic, firms will be 
forced to reduce stocks heavily to counteract the slowdown in sales. In fact, this 
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mechanism will create a large (but temporary) drop in investment. In Figure 5 we plot 
this reversal in expectations about the growth rate of GDP in 2009. The positive outlook 
about the economy lasted only up to September 2008 when the Lehman Brothers 
collapse prompted a major revision of growth expectations. The ensuing global crisis 
has been the major factor in the downward trend in expectations in the following 
months. Instead of a 7.5% growth rate, now the revised market expectations are more 
close to 2.5% growth rate. As second quarter figures were worse than expected, those 
expectations might be reduced even further.  
 
Private investment was growing more than 15 percent (quarter-over-quarter) since the 
last quarter of 2005. At the height of the boom, private investment grew up to 34 
percent in the second quarter of 2008. But, once expectations about GDP growth 
reversed, investment growth rates fell to 1.8% (2009Q1). Some of that fall is due to the 
rapid decrease of stocks. According to Central Bank estimates the slight fall (-1.1%) of 
aggregate demand in 2009Q1 would have been a 4.1% positive growth rate if we 
exclude the fall in inventories. 
 
Figure 5: Expectations about Peruvian GDP 2009 growth rate 
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       Source: Peruvian Central Bank. 
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Booms and busts are part of business cycles and cannot be avoided. The latter are 
accompanied by a reduction in employment growth rates (as already shown) and by a 
decline in earnings. In our case, average real labor income in Lima has experienced a 
slowdown, falling from a 9.4 percent annual growth rate in 2008 Q2 to a 3.1 percent 
growth in 2009 Q2 (see Figure 6). Falling labor incomes can, in fact, become one of the 
major concerns related to recession periods, as experiences reveal that adequate 
employment might easily turn into underemployment
3
 when the economy is in the 
downturn. 
 
Figure 6: Average real income in Metropolitan Lima (annual growth) 
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Source: Encuesta Permanente de Empleo EPE. 
 
Thus, it is important to have some sense of how different the labor market might behave 
in boom and bust periods. Given the lack of comparable data across a larger sample we 
constructed a transition matrix for a bust period (1998-1999) and another for a boom 
period (2007-2008)
4
. Table 1 allows us to have a much better idea of how fast adequate 
                                                 
3
 Underemployment refers to underemployment by income. That is, the share of the labor force working 
full-time but earning less than its corresponding household basic consumption basket (defined with the 
appropriate poverty line) divided by the average number of income earning household members in its 
corresponding geographic zone. 
4
 The ideal analysis would have comprised the period 1997-2002 for the bust scenario and the period 
2002-2008 for the boom. In addition, this analysis should be done using a single panel for the whole 
sample in order to track the same group of workers. We have privileged the use of a panel data set and, 
thus, data limitations force us to shorten the bust and boom periods to the ones shown in Table 1. We also 
tried with a longer panel for the bust period using a1998-2002 panel data set. However, there is a 
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employment might turn into underemployment or unemployment when the economy is 
in the downturn of the business cycle. Each cell in both panels of Table 1 show the 
probability of moving from a certain employment status (identified in the rows) to 
another one (identified in the columns). For example, panel A reveals that during a 
boom period, a worker with an adequate job has a high probability (69.4%) of keeping 
the same type of job. Panel B, on the other hand, shows that during a recession this 
probability falls nearly 10 percentage points. Workers who are not able to keep an 
adequate job move to underemployment status instead of moving to unemployment. In 
fact, during a recession, the probability of switching from adequate to underemployment 
raises from 23.2% to 32.1%, while the probability of losing an adequate job to 
unemployment only grows from 1.2% to 2.5%. As will be discussed later, this is 
consistent with the existence of a limited unemployment insurance mechanism that 
forces workers to rapidly switch to underpaid jobs.     
 
 
Table 1: Transition matrix between different employment status and inactivity 
2007-2008 (boom) vs. 1998-1999 (bust) 
 
Panel A: Boom 2007/2008 
T  T +1 
Adequately 
Employed 
Under 
employed 
Unpaid 
family 
worker 
Unemployed Inactive 
Total 
2007 
Adequately Employed 69.4% 23.2% 2.3% 1.2% 3.9% 100.0% 
Underemployed 19.8% 61.0% 7.6% 1.7% 10.0% 100.0% 
Unpaid family worker 5.0% 19.7% 59.0% 1.5% 15.0% 100.0% 
Unemployed 16.9% 28.8% 8.5% 11.9% 33.9% 100.0% 
Inactive 6.1% 19.3% 10.7% 3.1% 60.8% 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Bust 1998/1999 
T  T +1 
Adequately 
Employed 
Under 
employed 
Unpaid 
family 
worker 
Unemployed Inactive 
Total 
2007 
Adequately Employed 59.0% 32.1% 2.5% 2.5% 3.9% 100.0% 
Underemployed 17.5% 61.3% 7.5% 1.9% 11.9% 100.0% 
Unpaid family worker 4.8% 20.2% 58.2% 1.1% 15.7% 100.0% 
Unemployed 16.3% 41.5% 6.6% 11.8% 23.9% 100.0% 
Inactive 4.0% 18.5% 12.0% 3.5% 62.1% 100.0% 
Source: ENAHO 1998, 1999, 2007, 2008. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
significant loss in the number of observations available, so the results are not statistically significant. The 
main messages shown in Panel A, however, still hold. 
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3. Alternative policy options to deal with the crisis and 
beyond 
 
In the previous section, we have described the effects of the crisis on the pace of job 
creation in the aggregate economy, and showed how employment loss is affecting 
sectors with a strong tradable component, like manufacturing and extractive activities. 
Confronted with this scenario, policymakers face a relatively ample array of potential 
interventions. Thus, our objective in this section is to provide a clearer view of the 
policy options available and discuss their appropriateness given particular objectives, 
crisis scenarios and lessons already learned from existing interventions. 
 
Let us start by clarifying policy objectives. For this, we propose three dimensions based 
on the characteristics of the Peruvian labor market and its previous responses to 
economic downturns. In the first place, and as already discussed, it should be noticed 
that transitions to unemployment do not correlate with the business cycle. Thus, a surge 
in this status should not be the prime concern of policymaking. Instead, one can argue 
that welfare losses during recessions are mainly driven by movements towards 
underemployment. Concerns related to this phenomenon are based on the fact that 
losing an adequate job to underemployment implies moving to a consumption bundle 
below the poverty line. As discussed in World Bank (2009b), we can expect unskilled 
workers and those with little experience (such as women and young people) to be 
particularly vulnerable to a reduction in labor demand.  
 
Along with this, policymakers should also address more structural welfare issues related 
to workers’ access to social protection mechanisms such as pensions, social security and 
unemployment insurance. This implies providing incentives for the creation of formal 
jobs which, in our country, only reach half of the workforce.  
 
Given the above, in what follows our discussion will focus on policies’ potential for:  
(i) preventing adequate employment loss in the aggregate economy; (ii) preventing real 
income loss in particularly vulnerable groups (young, unskilled workers, women); and 
(iii) extending formal job benefits to a larger proportion of the employed population. All 
of these, balanced against the fiscal sustainability of the intervention.   
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The first two objectives listed above are closely related with the business cycle and, 
thus, will call for interventions of countercyclical nature. The third objective, on the 
other hand, has more to do with the structural phenomena that explain why our labor 
market exhibits a large informal sector as an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, policy 
options’ adequacy to tackle the first two objectives will depend on the magnitude of the 
shock and the way it transpires into the aggregate economy (which sectors are being hit 
and its duration). To deal with the third objective, on the other hand, we will need to 
address the determinants of equilibrium labor market outcomes in our country (labor 
productivity and labor market regulations in place). In both cases, we will need to take 
stock of our specific country circumstances and what has already proved effective. 
3.1 Coping with the cycle 
Let us now turn to the array of policy options available. On the more countercyclical 
(thus transitory) side of the spectrum, we can distinguish two subsets: (i) those aimed 
directly at the labor market; and (ii) those that seek to provide income support for the 
unemployed. The first subset, in turn, can be divided between job protection and worker 
protection programs.  
 
Protecting failing firms has, in general, the potential of generating moral hazard 
problems and unclear redistributive effects which can end up being markedly regressive. 
As mentioned in Ikenson (2008), taxpayers should not be forced to subsidize a 
company, specially an inefficient one. Stiglitz (2008), on the other hand, argues that the 
trickle down focus of the bailout (hoping that public funds given to the companies will 
eventually benefit workers) almost never works. Moreover, the author argues that even 
if they do work, bailouts fail to solve the problem in the most efficient or fairest way. 
We can always, however, invoke political economy considerations: if massive layoffs 
threaten to spur social unrest, one could be willing to set efficiency considerations aside, 
at least temporarily. Given the stylized facts already discussed, however, we do not 
think a protracted recession with the risk of massive job losses portrays the way the 
crisis will unravel in our country, and this should help dismiss the possibility of 
protecting jobs via bailouts. 
 
Other job protection mechanisms such as voluntary “work sharing” schemes, wage 
subsidies or temporary payroll tax holidays can end up providing an extra dose of 
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flexibility and alleviating firms’ labor cost. The external shock has led to a contraction 
in the demand for labor which, in the absence of any of these policy measures, would 
imply that firms will hire fewer workers at a lower equilibrium wage rate. Under this 
scenario, the implementation of a wage subsidy or a temporary payroll tax holiday 
could allow firms to hire the same amount of labor as before the shock keeping 
workers’ income intact. Thus, these job protection alternatives can effectively dampen 
job separations as the burden of keeping the post would be shared with the government.  
 
According to the Peruvian legislation, social security contributions are paid by the 
employer and are equivalent to 9% of workers’ salary. Employees, on the other hand, 
must pay between 12% and 13% to their pension fund administrator and between 10%-
30% to the government as income tax. In addition, firms are required to pay mid-year 
and end-of-year bonuses each equivalent to a complete monthly wage. These bonuses 
are part of the salary base used to calculate social security and pension contributions as 
well as income taxes. 
 
Under this framework, the Peruvian Congress has recently exonerated Independence 
Day (July) and Christmas wage bonuses from social security and pension contributions 
until 2010. Workers, however, have to pay income tax on the extra money they are 
receiving out of this income relief. From the workers point of view, this extra money is 
equivalent to a 3.7% increase in their annual pre-tax income. There is also a cost relief 
from the point of view of the firm as they are no longer required to pay social security 
contributions on these bonuses. This part of the policy measure is, thus, more along the 
lines of a temporary tax holiday described above. 
 
According to Reflexión Democratica (2009), the cost of this policy decision will be as 
follows: the social security administration (EsSalud) will receive US$ 150 million less 
each year and the public pension system (ONP) will receive around US$ 62 million less 
each year. It is expected that both institutions will ask the Finance Ministry to 
compensate this budget cut. In addition, we should also factor in that private pension 
fund administrators (AFPs) will receive lower fees as workers will contribute less to 
their pension funds. To compensate, AFPs might react by increasing fees’ rates and this 
will ultimately affect workers disposable income. Finally, an additional cost will come 
in terms of reduced future consumption as workers are choosing to save less today. 
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Other countries in the region have adopted similar job protection measures. According 
to World Bank (2009a), Chile has launched a 30% wage subsidy for low income (less 
than US$ 600 per month) youngsters who have finished high school and a temporary 
income tax reduction for firms that engage in training activities for their workers. 
Colombia, on the other hand, has reduced parafiscal contributions for new (less than 4 
years) enterprises, while Mexico has approved wage subsidies for exporting firms. 
 
One of the main caveats of this type of job protection policy is that it could be 
protecting the wrong post. In fact, these interventions can only affect formal jobs and 
this is why some authors doubt their countercyclical potential. In fact, Bosch and 
Maloney (2008), working with data from Mexico and Brazil, find evidence to support 
that the countercyclical nature of unemployment is explained mainly because of job 
separations from the informal sector.  
 
As stressed above, however, the adequacy of countercyclical policy interventions will 
depend on which sectors are being hit by the shock, and its potential to transpire into the 
rest of the economy. In this regard, Peruvian evidence discussed in the previous section 
shows that, in this particular recession, job separations are occurring mainly in tradable 
activities (like manufacturing), and these concentrate formal jobs. In fact, those 
concentrating informal jobs (like commerce with nearly 60% informality) still exhibit 
positive growth rates, so we can expect the informal sector to serve its traditional buffer 
role. Losing a formal job, in turn, implies a greater chance of losing an adequate post
5
, 
and this is consistent with the significant increase in the probability of moving from 
adequate employment to underemployment exhibited during the 1998-2001 recession. 
 
Within the realm of worker protection alternatives, reemployment services for 
dislocated workers can prove useful to achieve a greater impact on particularly 
vulnerable groups (related to our second policy objective). In this regard, the 
government has recently launched a free retraining program (Revalora Peru) for 
                                                 
5
 According to ENAHO 2008 data, nearly 55% of formal jobs are also adequate jobs. Moreover, this 
figure could be underestimated since data limitations force to identify formal jobs if the worker is 
receiving social security benefits. It is important to note that in Peru many formal workers pay income tax 
but do not receive social security benefits. Thus, formal independent workers (having an adequate job) 
could be erroneously classified as informal.  
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workers who have lost their job since the beginning of 2008. The fields in which 
training is being offered are construction (6 weeks), manufacturing (6 weeks), and 
tourism (3 weeks). The training is provided by three technical higher education 
institutes: Sencico (construction), Senati (manufacturing) and Cenfotur (tourism). 
Unemployed workers can registry themselves in decentralized Labor Ministry offices to 
access this program.  
 
A larger budget and greater focus, however, will be required if this program is to 
effectively protect the most vulnerable. Only 0.8% of the Economic Stimulus Plan is 
devoted to the retraining program. In addition, greater focus on vulnerable groups like 
women can help enhance the impact of the program. For example, while male workers 
in the mining sector (one of the tradable activities most severely hit by the crisis) 
already have similar skills to those required by construction and heavy industry, female 
workers in other vulnerable sectors (like textiles) are more specialized and could be 
harder to train and relocate in those activities. In addition, Yamada (2008b) has already 
found that, even in normal times, relocation comes with larger wage cuts for female 
workers: while average real wage downgrades for those who have found a new job after 
an episode of unemployment can be as high as 20%, this figure rises up to 41% for 
women. 
 
The list of income support programs, on the other hand, is preceded by unemployment 
insurance schemes and, in principle its benefits could be readily expanded to face a 
crisis by extending its duration and/or its coverage. In fact, Brazil has already extended 
its unemployment insurance by two months for all those who lost their job after 
December 2008.  
 
Our country, however, lacks a proper unemployment insurance mechanism. The closest 
thing we have to a contingent transfer in the event of unemployment is the 
Compensacion por Tiempo de Servicios (CTS). It consists of an annual payment 
equivalent to one monthly wage that the employer deposits on the employee’s bank 
account and, in principle, these funds should only be withdrawn when the job 
relationship is terminated. The CTS has two features that make it unsuitable as a policy 
instrument aimed at our first two objectives. First, it was not designed as a standard 
unemployment insurance that works as an automatic stabilizer of business cycles. In 
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fact, access to this benefit is limited only to formal dependant workers. Thus, and while 
it is true that the government could make a transfer to households using these accounts, 
this type of policy would be markedly regressive. Second, more importantly, its 
insurance nature has been distorted as Congress has repeatedly authorized its use for 
alternative purposes (to finance house building and transitory expansions in 
consumption). As a consequence, Yamada (2008b) fails to find evidence that access to 
CTS have helped workers that lost their jobs to avoid a wage downgrade by the time 
they found a new one. The author suggests that this may be a consequence of having 
access to CTS funds before the job is lost: limited funds are not enough to finance a job 
search long enough to avoid an underpaid new post
6
. Thus, rather than proposing it as a 
direct countercyclical instrument, policy recommendations related to CTS are more 
along the lines of ensuring that funds are not used before a minimum level is attained 
(Yamada suggests 5 monthly wages based on the average duration of unemployment 
spells). 
 
Given the above, if we seek to prevent large real income losses on those who fall into 
unemployment, we will need to resort on less sophisticated transfer mechanisms: direct 
cash transfers and/or public works programs. Regarding the former, direct conditional 
cash transfers are being used in Peru since 2005 via the Juntos program. The 
beneficiaries of this program are rural households in extreme poverty with children. In 
the first quarter of 2009, Juntos has transferred S/.100 every month to 422,491 families, 
for a total budget of S/.146 million. Although effective in alleviating immediate needs 
and fostering access to educational and health services (when these are available), this 
program is strictly focused on rural districts where focalization is relatively easy and, 
more importantly, where the effects of the external crisis are not being particularly 
strong.  
 
Public works, on the other hand, require a minimum set of conditions to create the 
proper incentives and improve cost-effectiveness, such as setting wages below the 
market average, choosing projects with a demand-driven approach, and minimizing 
non-labor costs. Evidence regarding the impact of this type of programs in Peru is 
                                                 
6
 It should be noticed that low-paid jobs typically force workers to offer longer hours in order to 
guarantee a minimum consumption level. This prevents workers from keep on looking for a job while 
having a low-paid one temporarily. 
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mixed. On one hand, Chacaltana (2003) has found positive effects related to the 
emergency social productive program A Trabajar-Urbano (ATU)
7
. During its first year, 
participating workers experienced a real income increase of S/.73 (25%), with respect to 
the control group. In addition, benefits related to the projects developed were estimated 
to be around 54% of total wage expenses. The author argues that part of this positive 
effect was because the program financed demand driven projects that were largely 
awaited by the population. In addition, Chacaltana suggests that the monthly wage was 
probably too high as workers in the first and second income quintiles had lower average 
incomes. This probably lured workers with higher opportunity costs and conspired 
against the program’s impact. 
 
On the negative side, Yamada (2008b) found that people who participate had problems 
to find a well paid job after leaving the program, facing wage cuts when compared to 
the job prior to ATU. The author suggested that this was the result of a stigma effect 
that signaled ATU beneficiaries as unproductive because they required government 
assistance. 
3.2 Structural changes for long-run benefits 
A thorough analysis and a detailed list of reforms to tackle existing problems with 
Peruvian labor market institutions, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we 
believe is important to address some basic structural issues given our third policy 
objective, and the fact that changes in regulation can also be an effective alternative to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis on the pace of adequate-job destruction.  
 
Policy actions aimed at our third objective will need to address more structural obstacles 
related to low productivity and high formal labor costs. In fact, large non-wage labor 
costs and severance payments intended as a job protection mechanism, combined with a 
low average productivity in the labor force, have deterred formal job creation and 
currently fuel an informal rate that is about 50% of total employment. Thus, we believe 
                                                 
7
 Now called Construyendo Peru. ATU was launched in 2001, with the objective of providing temporal 
employment to poor people affected by the economic downturn through simple public works that were 
highly labor intensive. Wage expenses were around 55% of the total budget and the program was able to 
generate 112,000 four-month jobs or 37,000 yearly jobs. The program paid a monthly wage of S/.300 to 
every worker. 
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two key elements of the MILES framework (World Bank (2008)) deserve especial 
attention: education and skills, and labor market regulations and institutions. 
 
If we talk about raising labor productivity part of the answer, of course, has to do with 
improving basic education quality and raising higher education coverage (Morón, 
Castro and Sanborn (2009)). On a short run basis, however, we will need to resort on 
training programs. In fact, if truly successful, a comprehensive training program could 
not only serve as a countercyclical measure (reducing unemployment duration) but 
could also provide a permanent increase in labor productivity thus increasing the 
benefits of formal job creation. As the promise is larger, however, successful 
implementation will be harder to achieve. In particular, we require more institutional 
capacity than in the case of labor tax exonerations, while the type of training provided 
also plays a crucial role. For the latter, demand driven programs (were firms are 
responsible for on-the-job training) have better prospects of succeeding as they have 
better prospects of transferring useful skills to individuals that would otherwise be 
unemployed or hired in low productivity jobs. 
 
In this regard, Díaz and Jaramillo (2006) have found that the Peruvian youth labor 
training program Projoven
8
 can increase the probability of accessing a paid job between 
5 and 17 percentage points. This training can also increase the probability of accessing a 
formal job by 9 to 18 percentage points, and raise real hourly earnings between 30% and 
69%. Not surprisingly, part of the success of Projoven is that it is demand driven. To 
promote this, and before public funds are transferred, training institutions must ensure 
(via an “intention letter”) that a firm is willing to offer the beneficiary an internship 
once training is over. 
 
Yamada (2008a) finds even larger impacts related to the training program financed by 
the European Union as part of the Programa de Lucha Contra la Pobreza en Lima 
Metropolitana (Propoli). This program estimated impact on expected real wages (i.e. 
the proportion on which real wages are increased as a result of the program, compared 
to that of the nonparticipants) is around 65%, and almost 100% if the sample is 
                                                 
8 
This program is managed by the Ministry of Labor, who finances 3-month training rounds focused on 
poor people between 16 and 24 years of age. Training is provided by a private institution and it must be 
followed by an internship.   
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restricted to those who had finished the program at least 6 months ago. Propoli’s 
training costs are around three times as much as Projoven’s due to longer training 
periods (6 to 12 months) and more selective training institutions. Additionally, Propoli 
restricted access to the program through an IQ test, training only young people who 
score “normal” or “above normal”9. Although Propoli did not require firms’ 
commitment via “intention letters”, training institutions selected for the program were 
among the most prestigious and offered training in highly demanded fields. 
 
Another mechanism that has helped improve labor market efficiency is the Red de 
Colocacion e Informacion Laboral (CIL) Proempleo, which is a public employment 
service. Although private employment services exist in the market, they target high 
profile workers that can afford paying for the service. Thus, private and public services 
tend to complement each other rather than compete. The Red CIL aims at reducing 
search costs for both employers and employees by improving the match between labor 
supply and demand. Chacaltana and Sulmont (2004) found that, as a result of the 
service, users increased their total earnings in 27% and their hourly earnings in 37%. 
The program, however, had limited coverage. 
 
The above represent three interventions that have proven successful dealing with 
specific labor market requirements of a more structural nature. As such, Yamada (2008a 
and 2009), suggests integrating them into a single, extended
10
 public effort. In fact, Red 
CIL can focus on facilitating demand-supply match for public programs like Projoven, 
Construyendo Peru, and even Revalora. The characteristics of Propoli, on the other 
hand, can be incorporated into Projoven as a second layer training for the most 
promising students. To promote sustainability and efficiency, this second layer could 
have a student-loan nature and repayment could start after graduation. 
 
The second element of the MILES framework that needs to be highlighted in this 
section, is that referred to labor market regulations and institutions. Our country is 
largely above the region’s average in non-wage costs and this is mainly explained by 
                                                 
9
 Applying this type of tests to select beneficiaries from the general population would have a regressive 
bias. However, it should be noticed that Propoli is targeted on the poor, from which the most promising 
individuals are selected. 
10
 Broadening the scope of training programs is also important. Yamada (2009) shows that Peruvian 
training and labor allocation programs only represent 0.04% of GDP. Mexico more than doubles our 
figure (0.09%) while countries like Spain and France have figures close to 1% of GDP. 
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vacations and bonuses. According to Jaramillo (2004), in Peru, non-wage costs 
represent nearly 60% of the gross salary, a figure only surpassed by the size of such 
costs in Argentina (and this is mainly due to Argentina’s large pension contributions). 
The World Bank’s 2009 Doing Business Report, on the other hand, ranked Peru 149 out 
of 181 economies in the “Ease of Employing Workers” index11, making it the weakest 
indicator of the Peruvian economy. 
 
While there is consensus about the fact that labor costs in our country are significantly 
high according to international standards, the literature offers mixed approaches to 
tackle the problem. On one hand, Jaramillo (2004) starts from the fact that our current 
labor code (or general regime) is too rigid and favors its revision so it would only 
ensure a minimum set of conditions, similar to those included in the special regime for 
small and microenterprises
12
. Extended benefits, then, should be the result of 
negotiation between firms and workers. He argues that the main problem with the 
special regime is, precisely, that it is special. This not only implies limited coverage but 
also that it can end up creating incentives for larger firms to split up in order to enjoy its 
benefits.  
 
Chacaltana (2008), on the other hand, starts from the fact that small firms have very low 
productivity and argues in favor of a special regime. He favors a “graduation” approach 
and suggests that transition to the general regime should be progressive: it should start 
around the sixth year after the microenterprise begins operating, and finish around the 
tenth. On a middle ground, Yamada (2008c), prioritizes a general reduction in severance 
payments but also favors progressive access to labor benefits for small and 
microenterprises. 
 
At this point we believe is important to remember that we have proposed three policy 
objectives to be served, and that the first two have to do with the fact that we a currently 
under the effects of an international crisis. Thus, when talking about labor costs, we 
would also like to stand on middle ground and suggest avoiding extensive labor code 
                                                 
11
 This index is composed by 19 indicators grouped in four categories: Difficulty of Hiring, Rigidity of 
Hours, Difficulty of Firing and Firing Costs. 
12
 The special regime for small and microenterprises (re-launched in June 2008), contemplates, among 
other incentives, halving vacations (from 30 to 15 days) and halving mid and end-year bonuses, each 
originally equivalent to a complete month salary. 
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revisions that would end up being unfeasible due to large political costs. According to 
World Bank (2007), Peruvian labor markets exhibit high firing and hiring costs 
compared to regional averages, so we suggest selecting specific adjustments which 
contribute in both avenues, instead of choosing a single recipe.  
 
Currently, firms are required to pay a month and a half salary for each year of work up 
to a maximum of 12 months. A relatively straightforward way to cut down severance 
payments is by reducing them to a single month salary while keeping the 12 month 
upper bound, as originally established in the labor reform of the early nineties. Another 
way to promote formality and enhance the effects of the special regime for small and 
microenterprises is to approve --for new contracts- the existence of two minimum wages 
in our labor legislation, one for large firms and a lower one for smaller firms. The 
current level of the minimum wage is the main deterrent for low productivity firms to 
switch fully to formality. This issue was pre-approved at the National Labor Council
13
 
in 2008 but it was aborted at the last hour. 
3.3 Conclusions so far 
Table 2 proposes a summary of policy options and recommendations discussed so far. 
These have been arranged taking into account the three policy objectives and alternative 
crises scenarios. If we are concerned about adequate employment and income loss 
(objectives 1 and 2) under a short-to-medium lived recession focused on the tradable 
sector, policies could narrow down to temporary reductions in non-wage labor costs 
such as the social security and pension contribution transitory exonerations discussed 
above. These will benefit formal activities and should be accompanied by a 
strengthened and better focalized re-employment service.   
 
However, if the shock transpires into the non-tradable side of the economy and we are 
still concerned about preventing income losses in vulnerable groups, we will need 
policy to reach workers involved in informal activities and the above will not suffice. 
Under such a scenario, a greater fiscal effort would be need to strengthen public work 
programs like ATU, but taking special care in maintaining its demand-driven nature and 
                                                 
13
 The National Labor Council (Consejo Nacional del Trabajo) was established in 2001 as part of an 
effort to counteract this problem and narrow down the policy debate promoting a less ideological 
discussion among the labor unions, the Ministry of Labor and the trade unions. 
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adjusting wages to maximize its impact and progressiveness by attracting low income- 
low opportunity cost workers. 
 
Table 2: Policy options available according to policy  
objectives and crisis scenarios 
 
 
Policy objectives and crisis scenarios 
1. Prevent adequate employment loss 
2. Prevent real income loss in vulnerable groups 
3. Extend formal 
employment benefits 
A. Short- to-medium lived  recession 
B. Protracted 
and widespread 
recession 
Focused on 
tradable sector 
Transpires into 
non-tradable sector 
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I. Active labor market policies 
(i) Job protection: 
 Temporary payroll tax holiday. 
(ii) Worker protection: 
 Strengthened and better focalized re-
employment service (Revalora Peru). 
 
 
II. Income support policies 
 Strengthened demand-driven public 
works programs attracting low income-
low opportunity cost workers  
(ATU-Construyendo Peru) 
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 III. MILES framework 
 
Macro policies 
Investment climate, institutions, infrastructure 
Labor market institutions and regulations 
High formal labor costs 
 Promote progressive access to labor 
benefits for small and microenterprises and 
cut down firing costs 
Education and skills 
Low productivity 
 Integrate and extend successful training 
and labor market information programs 
(Projoven – Propoli – RedCIL) 
Social protection 
Source: own elaboration based on typology suggested in TOR and World Bank (2009b). 
 
If we move towards a harsher crisis scenario and/or our third policy objective, we will 
need to resort to the two MILES framework components highlighted above. As already 
discussed, progressive access to labor benefits for small and microenterprises together 
with a generalized reduction in firing costs both serve our third objective and can also 
exert a countercyclical effect with no significant fiscal effort. This last characteristic is 
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particularly desirable under a protracted recession scenario, since this would imply a 
significant reduction in fiscal revenues which will have to be now focused on directly 
protecting vulnerable groups’ income. Finally, integrating and extending successful 
training and labor market information programs is key to enhance labor productivity, 
promote formal job creation and increase real incomes in the long-run. 
 
4. Quantitative scenarios and the effects of alternative policy 
options  
 
In this section we present the results of our modeling exercise. Obviously, the broad list 
of potential transmission channels and specific policy options discussed in the previous 
sections is beyond the scope of any modeling effort. Thus, our objective is to 
complement the analysis so far and provide further insight regarding three key issues: 
(i) the effects of the crisis on the evolution of aggregate GDP and formal employment; 
(ii) the countercyclical potential of selected policy interventions (with special emphasis 
on the distinction between transitory and permanent interventions); and (iii) the 
potential effects of changes in labor regulation and productivity on the long run 
participation of the formal sector in terms of employment and value added.  
4.1  Main model features 
The main characteristics of our model
14
 respond to the objectives highlighted above and 
to the nature of the shock as described in section 2. Extending Villacorta (2008), we 
build a three sector open economy model. The non-tradable sector demands domestic 
capital and labor to produce goods consumed only in the local market. The tradable 
sector, on the other hand, demands labor and imported capital to produce goods 
consumed both in the domestic and foreign markets. The third sector represents 
informal activity. It is modeled here as the sector with the lowest labor productivity 
which acts as a buffer for unemployed workers. Anyone losing a job in the other two 
sectors will find a job in this one
15
. We assume that the informal sector does not 
accumulate capital and its output is only for the domestic market.  
 
                                                 
14
 Please refer to Appendix 1 for further detail. 
15
 See equation  (6.)  in Appendix 1. 
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Since the crisis is hitting us mainly through what has been previously referred as the 
commercial channel, the tradable sector will play a crucial role in our modeling 
exercise. Within this sector, real returns to both labor and capital depend on 
international prices. Thus, reduced external demand leading to a worsening in terms of 
trade will invariably make this sector less profitable. Capital will seek to flow to the 
non-tradable sector and/or abroad, while labor will also aim to move to the non-tradable 
sector or informality. The extend at which this will end up hitting production and formal 
employment at the aggregate level will depend, basically, on: (i) the relative size of the 
tradable sector in terms of value added and employment; (ii) labor productivity within 
sectors; and (iii) factor mobility between sectors. Obviously, as the share of production 
accounted for by the tradable sector grows larger, the larger will be the pass-through of 
the initial shock to aggregate GDP. In addition, sectors are connected through the 
capital market. As capital moves across to the non-tradable sector in search for a larger 
return, labor will follow to maintain optimal capital-to-labor ratios. Thus, lower labor 
productivity in the receiving sector will also contribute to transmit the initial shock into 
the aggregate economy: production gains in the receiving sector will be smaller than 
production losses in the sector initially hit by the shock. On the other hand, capital 
mobility between the tradable and non-tradable sector should have a mitigating effect. If 
less capital is allowed to move across to the non-tradable economy, less labor will be 
demanded by this sector and, thus, more will end-up in the informal side of the 
economy. Thus, production gains will now be even smaller than production losses. 
  
At this point, it is worth highlighting that one of the limitations of our model is that we 
have avoided the introduction of nominal rigidities or other market imperfections that 
could have an amplifying effect on the initial shock. An important implication of this is 
that the results that stem from our simulations should be understood as an upper 
boundary of the way our economy will react to the crisis in the absence of a fiscal 
expansion other than the specific labor market policy measures we model.  
 
We want to capture the basic stylized facts of the real shock just described (serving our 
first objective), but we want to do this without loosing sight of what is behind the short 
and long-run effect of alternative policy interventions (to serve our last two objectives). 
Thus, two key attributes of our model are that it is based on behavioral relationships and 
that it includes a stochastic component when modeling families’ decisions. Compared to 
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other modeling exercises that could capture the stylized facts of the shock based on 
reduced form relations, this will allow our model to provide insight on two additional 
aspects: (i) how does the long run allocation of resources respond to a new set of 
structural conditions; and (ii) what are the consequences (for policy) of dealing with 
agents that make decisions based on their expectations of the future. Accounting for 
these aspects is crucial if we are to comply with our last two objectives: distinguish the 
effects of transitory vs. permanent interventions while the crises goes on, and measure 
the effects of the permanent ones on formal employment and output, once the crisis is 
over. 
 
Our model could be enriched in at least two ways. First, it could be interesting to model 
the behavior of the informal sector instead of assuming a passive response to a major 
shift in aggregate economic conditions. In addition –and as already discussed- one could 
introduce rigidities preventing a smooth transition of workers from tradable to non-
tradable activities. This would not only add an extra dose of realism regarding the 
response of each labor market, but will also make a case for active labor market 
interventions such as retraining programs. 
4.2 Alternative crisis scenarios  
In the previous section, we discussed policy options under two alternative scenarios: a 
short-to-medium lived recession vs. a protracted and widespread recession. Analysts’ 
expectations regarding the crisis resemble the milder one. In fact, in its June 2009 
Inflation Report, the Central Bank has revised up its expectations of a further 
deterioration of export prices included in the March version. Instead of a drop of 26.6% 
in 2009 and a recovery of 6.1% in 2010, the Central Bank now expects a reduction of 
20.3% in 2009 and a smaller recovery of 4.4 percent in 2010. In addition, it presents 
FDI projections close to 2008 levels (US$ 4 billion) and argues that the Peruvian 
economy will not get severely hit at the financial front compared to other Latin 
American countries. 
 
Despite the above, we will start using our model to reproduce both crisis scenarios. 
Although our policy simulations will be based on the short-lived recession as a baseline, 
comparisons with the prolonged recession scenario will provide further insight on the 
effects of transitory vs. permanent interventions.  
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Box 1: Understanding steady state growth rates 
 
If we look at the level of macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP, consumption and 
investment through a sufficiently long period of time, we will notice they exhibit a 
positive trend. This implies that, besides short term fluctuations, all these variables have 
a long-run, relatively stable, positive growth rate. This rate is what can be understood as 
a steady state growth rate which, in principle, defines a situation in which all these 
variables grow at a constant rate. 
 
Of course, steady state growth rates can be modified and this is, precisely, what an 
endogenous growth model seeks to explain. These models rely on variables such as 
education, institutions and openness to explain how an economy can move towards a 
new steady state and start exhibiting a different long-term growth path. 
 
Our model is not a growth model. In fact, it is designed to account for business cycle 
fluctuations and, particularly, account for the way in which real variables affect the 
business cycle. Therefore, the growth rates we present should be understood as 
additional to the long-run subjacent steady state growth rate. Any temporary shock that 
does not change the steady state equilibrium will eventually vanish and all variables will 
return to their long run (steady state) growth rates. A key characteristic for the shock to 
vanish is that each period only a fraction of its previous value remains (it is modeled as 
a stationary autoregressive process). Under this setting, permanent policies can be 
simulated by giving a value close to one to the autoregressive parameter, so the current 
value of the shock (or policy instrument) remains almost permanently affected by the 
innovation introduced several periods behind. This implies that all variables in levels 
(such as formal employment participation) reach a new equilibrium value but they all 
stop growing (as explained above, our model is not a growth model). 
 
The steady state growth rate can, however, be estimated outside the model. For this, one 
could think of it as the growth rate of potential output, i.e. the level of output that would 
prevail in a frictionless world. On more practical terms, one could think of steady state 
growth as a long-term average and, thus, one could approximate this rate by means of a 
cycle-trend decomposition of real GDP data. If we remove high frequency fluctuations 
from Peruvian 1993-2008 real GDP, the remaining trend exhibits a growth rate of 5% 
per year. Thus, to approximate actual growth figures, the reader should add 5 percentage 
points to the year-to-year growth rates reported in the main text. 
 
 
 
In Figure 7, we compare the response of the key macro variables related to the 
objectives of this section, under these two scenarios. In our model, the short-lived 
recession is triggered by a 20% drop in export prices in period 1 (year 2009)
16
. The 
prolonged recession scenario, on the other hand, is also triggered by a 20% drop in 
                                                 
16
 The average terms of trade decline in the year starting in 2009 Q2 has been 18.4%. 
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export prices in the first period, but this is accompanied by a further 10% drop in period 
2 (year 2010)
17
. At this point, it is worth highlighting that all year-to-year growth 
figures are expressed as deviations from the variables’ steady state growth rates. 
 
Due to the connection between real returns and export prices in the tradable sector, the 
first round of the shock directly affects employment and production in this side of the 
economy. Tradable GDP annual growth falls more than 15% with respect to its 
equilibrium rate. As discussed above, capital is mobile and this should help dampen the 
effects of the shock on the aggregate economy both in terms of formal employment and 
GDP. However, these effects are less than perfectly offset: to maintain optimal capital-
to-labor ratios, some labor must be lost to informality and aggregate formal employment 
falls nearly 2% in year 1. Additionally, in the non-tradable sector labor is less 
productive than in the tradable sector, so production gains in the former are smaller than 
production losses in the latter. This, together with the fact that the tradable sector 
accounts for nearly 35% of aggregate production, implies that aggregate GDP growth 
falls nearly 5% below its steady state rate the first year of the crisis.  
 
Consistent with the existence of flexible prices, wages in the tradable sector will exhibit 
a similar pattern as output and employment. In particular, wages in the tradable sector 
fall nearly 10% in year 1 and 1.4% in year 2 under the mild recession scenario. 
Although considerably smaller, we can also observe a reduction in wages in the non-
tradable sector. In this case, however, the reason is different: due to an expansion in 
labor supply in this sector, wages fall 0.3%. 
 
The last three panels of Figure 7 depict the evolution of other key variables that will be 
useful when comparing policy interventions. For now, it suffices to say that tax 
revenues deterioration due to a reduction in formal activity raises the fiscal deficit in 1% 
in terms of output. On the other hand, and consistent with the decline in formal 
employment and the level of activity in the tradable sector, formal employment and 
GDP (expressed as a percentage of total employment and output) fall nearly 1 and 2 
percentage points, respectively.  
 
                                                 
17
 We have decided not to introduce shocks to external financial conditions based on the stylized facts 
discussed in section 2 and Central Bank’s latest projections regarding FDI flows.  
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Figure 7: Alternative crisis scenarios 
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As revealed in Figure 7, the main differences between the short-lived and prolonged 
recessions are in period 2. Under the first scenario, output almost recovers its steady 
state growth rate and formal employment ceases to fall in period 2. If export prices 
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experience a continued decline (as the rest of the world takes more time to recover from 
the crisis), on the other hand, output growth will remain below its equilibrium level by 
nearly 4 percentage points and, consequently, formal employment will fall again by a 
figure close to 1.5% in year 2010. 
 
4.3 Alternative policy options 
 
In the discussion that follows, our aim is to serve the last two objectives of this 
modeling exercise: highlight the countercyclical potential of transitory vs. policy 
interventions of a more permanent nature, and assess the impact of the latter on formal 
employment and output.  
 
As already discussed, we believe our model is particularly suited for this kind of 
exercise. In terms of our summary of policy objectives, crisis scenarios and policy 
options (see Table 2), this exercise should be interpreted as a comparison between cycle 
dependant active labor market policies and those that stem from the MILES framework 
(in particular, those referred to labor market institutions and education and skills). In 
fact, a transitory reduction in the labor tax will serve to mimic a temporary payroll tax 
holiday which is, clearly, a cycle-dependent type of policy intervention. A permanent 
reduction, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a change in labor market regulation 
conducive to cut down non-wage labor costs. Transitory changes in total factor 
productivity (TFP) can serve to illustrate the potential effects of training programs for 
dislocated workers. In fact, we assume this to be a shock of transitory nature since 
training is aimed at helping the unemployed find a new job and we cannot expect it to 
yield a permanent increase in labor productivity. Productivity enhancement programs, 
on the other, are expected to have more enduring effects and will therefore be 
interpreted via a permanent increase in TFP parameters. 
 
Figure 8 compares a transitory and permanent reduction in labor tax with our baseline 
scenario (that referred as a short-lived recession in the previous discussion). In both 
cases, the labor tax is reduced by 20% in the first two periods. In the permanent 
scenario, this reduction is sustained in the years that follow. According to labor costs 
estimated in Jaramillo (2004), and if we exclude workers contribution to the pension 
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system, the transitory reduction is consistent with temporarily suppressing firms 
contribution to social security (public health). The permanent reduction, on the other 
hand, is consistent with eliminating one of the two yearly bonuses, each equivalent to a 
full month salary. It is worth highlighting that the temporary policy measure will have a 
fiscal cost as funds for social security will have to be transferred by the central 
government. Eliminating worker bonuses, on the other hand, should not entail any fiscal 
effort since this is a direct transfer from firms to families. To simulate this using our 
labor tax parameter, we reduced government transfers to families by the same amount, 
so the fiscal budget remained untouched while the family experienced an income 
reduction. 
 
Figure 8, reveals several results that are worth highlighting. First, and despite having the 
same size in period 1, the permanent policy shock delivers a stronger countercyclical 
effect: aggregate GDP growth falls almost 2 percentage points less with respect to its 
equilibrium value, while formal employment grows nearly 1 percentage point more. 
Permanent policies have a stronger effect due to the forward-looking nature of agents, 
which implies that expected future outcomes affect current decisions
18
. 
 
In addition, our temporary payroll tax holiday prevents formal employment loss. As less 
labor moves into the informal sector and aggregate formal employment rises, formal 
employment participation grows, temporarily, above its equilibrium value (50%). The 
permanent policy shock, however, not only delivers a larger growth in formal 
employment participation on impact (consistent with its stronger countercyclical 
potential) but, more importantly, it delivers a long run effect: the participation of formal 
employment grows by nearly 2 percentage points in the new steady state, as the cost of 
being formal has been permanently reduced. The fifth panel in Figure 8 reveals that 
formal GDP participation experiences a similar long-run increase under the permanent 
intervention scenario
19
.  
                                                 
18
 Agents in the model are "forward looking" in the sense that they take current decisions based on the 
discounted future flow of revenues (consumption) which result form that decision. Because of this, 
permanent policies tend to have a greater impact today since their discounted future flow of effects is 
larger. The opposite would imply having "myopic" agents, which take decisions based only on current 
(static) revenues. 
19
 The reader would notice that these permanent effects on formal employment and formal GDP are not 
accompanied by a permanent impact on GDP growth rate which, as shown in the first panel of Figure 7, 
returns to its original steady state growth rate. As explained in Box 1, our model is not a growth model 
and, thus, is unable to reproduce changes in long-run growth rates. It does, however, produce changes in 
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Figure 8: Baseline scenario vs. transitory and  
permanent 20% reduction in labor tax 
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long-terms level values. Thus, if we simulate a permanent shock such as a reduction in labor costs or a 
permanent increase in TPF level (it is important to notice that this simulation is a permanent change in the 
level of TPF and not in its growth rate), we can obtain permanent effects in the level of some variables 
including those expressed as proportions, e.g. the participation of formal employment or the participation 
of formal GDP. 
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Finally, and consistent with the fact that the temporary policy is a tax cut, the fiscal 
deficit remains larger under this scenario than under the permanent intervention. In fact, 
the fiscal deficit converges to a new steady state value below 1% under this last 
scenario, as the size of the formal economy grows and remains larger. Despite being 
more expensive than the permanent policy, our temporary tax cut proves less costly (in 
fiscal terms) than the baseline scenario, as increased economic activity more than 
compensates a lower labor tax rate. 
 
Although it does not correspond to what we believe is the most probable crisis scenario, 
Figure 9 illustrates the same policy comparison but under a prolonged recession. In this 
case, it becomes clearer that the permanent policy’s stronger countercyclical potential is 
more significant in period 1. If the crisis is sustained, thus, additional short run benefits 
from the permanent intervention are more along the lines of a smaller fiscal burden. As 
revealed in the last panel of Figure 9, relying on tax cuts to offset the effects of the crisis 
under a prolonged recession becomes much more expensive: the fiscal deficit remains 
close to 2.5% for several periods as more debt needs to be taken to finance the 
countercyclical effort. The permanent policy intervention, on the other hand, does not 
imply a significant deviation of the fiscal deficit from its 1% steady state value. This 
comparison confirms that business cycle independent policies of the class proposed in 
the MILES framework can be more convenient under the protracted crisis scenario, as 
proposed in Table 2.  
 
Finally, in Figure 10 we compare the outcome of a temporary increase in TFP in both 
formal sectors (tradable and non-tradable) with a permanent increase in the same 
parameters. In this case, we propose an increase of 3%. This is consistent with the 
expansion experienced in the contribution of TFP to GDP growth after the structural 
reforms of the 90s
20
. In a recent study, Burga and Morales (2006) found that the most 
promising policy interventions to attain another significant TFP increase are those 
aimed at: (i) reducing red tape and administrative steps required to start a new business; 
(ii) increasing political stability, reducing corruption and granting a predictable 
Judiciary system; and (iii) closing the infrastructure gap recently estimated to be around 
30% of GDP (Pastor and Pérez (2009)). 
                                                 
20
 Based on authors own calculations using Solow residual estimates for the period 1980-2008.  
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Figure 9: Prolonged recession scenario vs. transitory and  
permanent 20% reduction in labor tax 
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Figure 10: Baseline scenario vs. transitory and  
permanent 3% increase in total factor productivity 
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A revealed in Figure 10, this type of intervention has a stronger countercyclical force 
than labor tax reductions if we compare transitory vs. permanent policy shocks in each 
case. In fact, TFP increases directly affect both capital and labor productivity. 
Consistent with this, a TFP increase with enduring effects has the largest ability to 
counteract the external shock: GDP growth is almost unscathed.  
 
In this case, it is also worth looking at the changes in steady state values. Formal 
employment participation grows only 0.5 percentage points with a 3% increase in total 
factor productivity, while formal GDP participation exhibits a similar increase as with 
the permanent formal labor cost reduction. As already mentioned, productivity gains 
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under this last intervention scenario are not only focused on labor and, thus, can exhibit 
a smaller impact on formal employment. It must be said, however, that this avenue has 
no limit compared with a reduction in labor costs. TFP can be permanently enhanced 
and this exercise reveals its potential impact on formal employment participation.  
 
Results highlighted in this section have helped make a stronger case for policy 
interventions that stem from the MILES framework. First, if we are concerned about 
adequate employment and income loss during the crisis, policy interventions of a 
permanent nature exhibit a larger countercyclical potential. As already mentioned, this 
result depends on the forward-looking nature of agents responsible of investment and 
labor supply decisions, and this means that expected future outcomes affect current 
decisions. Thus, and given the same policy shock on impact, labor flows away from the 
tradable sector (and into informality) are more effectively deterred if the promise of 
larger real returns is perceived as permanent. In addition, simulation results reveal that 
in the event of a prolonged recession, the fiscal burden of active labor market policies 
can be significantly larger, while adjustments to labor market regulations do not imply 
significant deviations of the fiscal deficit from its equilibrium level. 
 
On the other hand, and if we are concerned about the size of the formal sector, the only 
effective avenue comes from the MILES framework and, in particular, from those 
elements that tackle the prime drivers of informality in our country: low productivity 
and high formal labor costs. Simulations show how changes in labor market regulations 
conducive to a reduction in labor costs and reforms aimed at increasing factor 
productivity, deliver long run benefits in terms of extending formal employment 
benefits to a larger share of the employed population. This occurs to the extent in which 
these policy interventions imply changing structural conditions that affect the 
equilibrium allocation of resources. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The current worldwide economic downturn is hitting our economy mainly through the 
commercial channel. Falling external demand for our exports has reduced real returns in 
the tradable sector, affecting employment and production in this side of the economy. 
Job separations in extractive and manufacturing activities with a strong tradable 
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component imply that employment loss is concentrated in formal posts which, in turn, 
can be largely classified as adequate. Those activities concentrating informal jobs (like 
commerce) still exhibit positive growth rates both in terms of production and job 
creation. A surge in informality and underemployment, thus, is the main risk that the 
policymaker should aim to mitigate through the cycle.  
 
In fact, the 1998-2001 recession has revealed that downturns are accompanied by a 
significant increase in the probability of moving from an adequate job to 
underemployment. A similar situation can be expected during the current slowdown but 
with less intensity, since during our past recession job separations were much more 
pervasive. 
 
In theory, formal job separations can be reduced if the burden of keeping the job is 
shared with the government. For this, and as our simulations have shown, temporary 
payroll tax holidays or wage subsidies have a countercyclical potential. In principle, 
they should help firms demand a similar amount of labor without reducing workers 
income. Fiscal costs related to this kind of interventions, however, can be particularly 
high and especially if the world economy takes more time to recover.  
 
Temporary exonerations from social security and pension contributions already 
implemented for wage bonuses will press the fiscal budget for an extra US$ 424 million 
during their two year duration. It should be noticed that the original proposal also 
comprised income tax exonerations but these were dismissed due to budgetary 
considerations. 
 
Further temporary but generalized exonerations, thus, will be difficult to implement. We 
need to resort to additional short-run measures that can still have an impact during the 
second year of the crisis and have a more focalized nature, such as retraining and 
temporary public works programs. For these to be truly cost-effective, efforts should 
concentrate on targeting low income workers and, among them, women and the young. 
 
On the more structural side of policy intervention, our simulations have revealed that 
permanent non-wage labor cost reductions can increase formal employment and formal 
GDP by 2 percentage points. Policies conducive to this were modeled as halving 
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bonuses or vacations in a way similar to that already implemented in the special labor 
regime for small and micro enterprises. This special regime constitutes an important 
step towards granting progressive access to labor benefits for low productivity firms and 
its potential for formal job creation could be complemented by introducing two 
minimum wage levels according to firm size for new contracts, and a generalized 
reduction in firing costs. 
 
Our simulations have also served to highlight the role of productivity increases if we 
seek to expand formal employment benefits to a larger share of the workforce. In 
particular, our results reveal that formal employment participation can rise 0.5 
percentage points for every 3% increase in total factor productivity. There is, however, 
no silver bullet to accomplish the latter. Some recent studies point towards the need to 
reduce administrative steps required to open new businesses as well as the provision of 
infrastructure. If we focus our attention on the labor market, however, we will find some 
promising experiences aimed at increasing labor productivity that can be strengthened 
and integrated into a single intervention package: Projoven, Propoli and Red CIL. 
 
Our quantitative exploration has also allowed some interesting comparisons. Structural 
policy interventions as the ones discussed in the previous paragraphs have not only 
proven effective to accomplish structural transformations (such as increasing formal 
employment participation) but can also exhibit a large countercyclical potential due to 
their permanent nature. This should help make a stronger case for policy interventions 
that stem from a structural reform agenda and implies that we should not wait for the 
crisis to be over to start their implementation. 
 
Our results, however, do not rule out the need for temporary labor market interventions 
due to three considerations that cannot be overlooked. First, changes in labor market 
regulations have to overcome complex political economy issues since this reform has 
concentrated costs (veto groups representing those who have a formal job) and 
dispersed benefits (those who still remain in informality). In addition, the effects of a 
comprehensive training program will take time to materialize and there is a need for 
short-term results in order to help with the countercyclical effort. Finally, policies must 
be regarded as credible in order to exert all the countercyclical and long-term potential 
depicted in our model. This is difficult to ensure as labor regulations in Peru are still 
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perceived as subject to debate and the range of policy alternatives remains too ample. In 
fact, the contents of a new General Labor Code have been under discussion in Congress 
for the last five years, without having reached a consensus.  
 
Obstacles to implement and delays in getting results, however, should not be an obstacle 
to pursue these policies. As already mentioned, the current situation should be used as 
an opportunity to address them, as they are the only way to attain long-run objectives 
such as extending the benefits of formal employment without resorting to unsustainable 
fiscal policies. 
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Appendix 1: The Model 
 
As in Villacorta (2008) we model the Peruvian economy as a small open economy in 
which households are represented by a homogenous single agent and a continuum of 
competitive firms divided into two different sectors with behavior to produce two 
goods. 
 
The domestic consumption good is labor intensive and is manufactured in the country 
but not abroad.  This will be the non tradable good (Y
N
) of the economy which is 
produced by means of a Cobb Douglas technology.  Capital used in this sector will be 
supplied domestically. 
 
1( , )
NT NT NT
t t tY F K L       [ 1.] 
 
The tradable good (Y
T
) will be capital intensive and it will be distributed between 
internal and external demand. The share of this good that is directed to the external 
demand will define the total amount of exports of the economy.  
 
1( , )
T T T
t t tY F K L       [ 2.] 
 
Capital used in the tradable sector only will come from abroad. Therefore, the level of 
imports will be set by the level of investment in capital goods for this sector in each 
period. However, all investment (used in both sectors) will have to pay an extra cost, 
which can be understood either as a tax or as an increase in credit cost. In our case, this 
extra cost will play the role of a tax which will be collected by the government.  
Domestic households can borrow or lend resources coming from exports in the external 
bond market. 
 
The public sector will finance its expenses and transfers collecting an income tax, a 
labor tax and a capital tax to both sectors. Any remaining fiscal imbalance will be 
financed using the external bond market. 
 
1. Families 
 
Families will be represented by an infinite lived continuum of households; they will 
have access to capital markets and therefore they can smooth their consumption path 
through their lives. They can take debt today to consume more or save to accumulate 
more assets and have higher future consumption. For these purposes, the model contains 
three assets (real and financial): 
 
 Capital goods used as factors of production in the non tradable sector. 
 Capital goods used as factors of production in the tradable sector. 
 External bonds which offer an international interest rate. 
Individuals consume both non tradable and tradable goods. Of course, have to decide 
how much hours they will work in the tradable and non tradable sectors. Working 
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reduces their present utility but allows them to increase their future utility as they can 
increase their consumption in the future. Their utility function is as follows: 
 
1 11
( , , )
1 1 1
t
NT T
T NT t t
t t t t NT T
C L L
U C L L b b
 
  
 
  
  
     [ 3.] 
 
This function exhibits positive but decreasing returns with respect to consumption 
goods at all times. Therefore, there will not be a saturation point but, at all times, the 
marginal unit of consumption will bring less utility than the last one. 
 
Members of these households use their intertemporal income to consume non tradable 
and tradable goods, and to accumulate capital goods or bonds investing in both sectors 
of the economy. The problem faced by households can be summarized as follows: 
 
1 11
0
[ ]
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
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
 
  
      [ 4.] 
Subject to: 
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[ 5.] 
 
Households optimize their intertemporal utility maximizing the discounted sum of 
period utilities (discounted at a rate β). However, the choice of their consumption level 
at each point in time is limited by their intertemporal budget constraint: present income 
can finance either consumption now or asset accumulation for future consumption. 
 
Equation 5 reflects the intertemporal budget constraint of households. In this equation 
NT
tw  represents the salary paid by non tradable firms, whereas 
T
tw  is the salary paid by 
tradable firms. NTtL represents the number of active workers in the non tradable sector 
and TtL  those that work in the tradable sector. In addition, there is an informal sector that 
will be modeled as a supply determined sector. If there are workers willing to work but 
are not employed by the first two formal sectors, then the informal sector will pay them 
a fixed salary tw  which will be always lower than those in the formal sector. Therefore, 
if a shock moves employment away from its steady state level, some of the unemployed 
workers will be absorbed –with a lower salary- by the informal sector. 
 
1 2( ) ( )
SS SS SSI I NT NT T T
t t t t t tL L L L L L            [ 6.] 
 
The interest rates paid to capital in each sector and in the bond market are: NTtr , 
T
tr  and 
B
tr , and kt  is the capital tax that will be paid by the families. Investment will increase 
capital in both sectors ( NTtK , 
T
tK ) once we take into account the depreciation rate. In a 
similar fashion, the stock of international and government bonds will be denoted by ItB  
and GtB , respectively. 
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 [ 7.] 
 
   [ 8.] 
 
 
The representative agent will receive, in period t, two types of salaries for labor offered 
in each sector, and three types of rents derived from the assets held. 
  
As the model is expressed in domestic consumption goods, capital goods (used for the 
tradable sector) produced entirely abroad are expressed in domestic consumption goods 
using the real exchange rate tS . This capital is levied with a proportional tariff denoted 
by K , therefore its purchasing price should be multiplied by (1+ K ). Bonds are 
expressed in external consumption goods, which need to be scaled by the real exchange 
rate to express them as domestic consumption goods. tT  define all public transfers set 
by the government in favor of households in period t.  
 
Putting together all the elements mentioned above, we can set up the intertemporal 
Lagrangean that characterizes the consumer problem as: 
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The first order conditions of this maximization problem are: 
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   0
t
l


 

 Budget constraint     [ 15.] 
 
These conditions can be re-written in the following form: 
1(1 )
NT NT NT
t t tI K K   
1(1 )
T T T
t t tI K K   
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1
1
1(1 )
t
t
I t
t
t t
C S
r
E C S







               [ 16.] 
 
1
, 1(1 )
t
S t
t
S
S
         [ 17.] 
 
Equation (17.) defines the exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation) in period t+1. 
Combining (16.) and (17.), and assuming that 1 , 1 0
B
t S tr     we can write the Euler 
condition of the problem as:  
1
1 , 1(1 )
t
t
I
t S t
t
C
r
E C


 


 
        [ 18.] 
 
This will determine the optimal consumption path. The optimal growth rate of 
consumption will be determined by two variables: (i) the return of investing in the 
domestic asset (defined by the external return plus the real exchange rate depreciation); 
and (ii) the intertemporal discount rate that defines preferences for current consumption. 
The growth rate of consumption will emerge as the equilibrium between these two 
forces. 
 
Combining equations (9.), (12.), (13.), (14.) and (17.) and assuming that , 1 0S t    we 
can arrive at an uncovered interest rate parity condition: 
 
1
1 , 1 1 , 1
T
NT It
t S t t S t
t
r
r r
S
              [ 19.] 
 
This condition states that the real domestic asset used in the production of non tradable 
goods must pay the same interest rate as the real foreign asset after considering 
exchange rate depreciation. Likewise, the interest rate of bonds expressed in local 
currency must be equal to those rates netting out the depreciation rate of physical assets. 
In this way, this parity condition assures that all of three assets will coexist in 
equilibrium. 
 
As usual, the transversality condition lim 0
i
t t
t
K 

 , states that capital in the last period 
becomes unproductive as there are no additional periods in which it could become 
output. Therefore, the value of capital in the last period should be zero, unless 
consumption reports no utility, which will be reflected by  = 0. In that particular case, 
the value of  Kt  will be different from zero as we will not want to consume more. This 
last result is not possible if the utility function does not have a saturation point as in our 
case: the marginal utility of consumption and  will be greater than zero at all times. 
 
Combining equations (9.), (10.) and (11.) we can derive the conditions for choosing 
between labor and consumption which define the labor supply for both sectors: 
 
NT
NTNT t
t
t
b L
w
C


      [ 20.] 
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T
TT t
t
t
b L
w
C


       [ 21.] 
 
2. Firms 
 
We assume a continuum of competitive firms that employ labor and capital in perfectly 
competitive input markets. Firms with explicit behavior are divided into two sectors:  
the non tradable and the tradable sector, which caters to the domestic and foreign 
markets. 
 
In both sectors we use a Cobb-Douglas production function. This function has the 
classical assumptions of constant returns to scale, positive yet diminishing returns in 
each input and Inada conditions guarantee a steady state. 
 
However, each production function has different productivity levels and also different 
shares for capital and labor.  
 
Non tradable sector:  
1NT NT NT NT
t t t tY A K L
 
     [ 22.] 
Tradable sector:  
1T T T T
t t t tY A K L
 
     [ 23.] 
 
The non tradable sector is characterized as a more labor intensive sector whereas the 
tradable sector will be more capital intensive (  ). Firms behave as in perfect 
competition and maximize their benefits choosing the optimal combination of labor and 
capital. 
 
Non-tradable sector 
Non tradable firms have to pay a value added tax ( ) over their production level and an 
extra cost for the two inputs used in the production. As mentioned above, in this model 
this extra cost will play the role of a tax which will be collected by the government. In 
this way the production level of this sector will be determined solving the following 
problem. 
 
Max: 
1
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
t t t L t t K t tA K L w L r K
 
  

      
 
Investment decision:  
1
1(1 )
1
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NT NT t
t t NT
K t
K
r A
L






 
  
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     [ 24.] 
Contracting decision:  
1(1 ) (1 )
1
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NT NT t
t t NT
L t
K
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




 
   
  
    [ 25.] 
 
 
Tradable sector 
As in the non tradable sector, tradable firms have to pay a value added tax ( ), a capital 
tax ( K ) for the capital rented and a labor tax ( L ) for the labor employed. Since 
production if offered to both markets, firms have to include into its maximization 
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problem the relative price between export goods and tradable goods offered for 
domestic consumption. In this maximization problem T
tP is the relative price of export 
goods which is determined abroad. Moreover, the share of production supplied to both 
markets will not be a decision taken by the firm, because the export level is determined 
exogenously by the external demand.   
 
Max 
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Investment decision: 
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Contracting decision: 
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3. Government 
 
Public sector revenues come from income, labor and capital taxes. Recurrent 
expenditures are denoted as tG  and transfers to households as tT . Any fiscal gap will be 
covered using the international bonds market. 
 
( ) ( )NT T NT Tt t t K t tY Y I I           [ 28.] 
1( (1 ) )
G G G
t t t t t t tG T S B r B              [ 29.] 
 
 
4. Equilibrium 
 
Aggregating households’ budget constraint and combining it with the maximization 
conditions for firms (25), (26), (27) and (28) we obtain the following equation: 
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Balance of payments equilibrium implies that the current account is equal to the capital 
flow account, which is represented in our model by the accumulation of international 
bonds. 
 
1 1( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )
I I I G G G
t t t t t t t t t tX M S B r B S B r B         
 
If we replace government equations (28.), (29.) and the balance of payments condition 
into the last equation, we can obtain the aggregate demand equation of the economy: 
 
t t
NT T
t t t t t tC I S I G X M Y       
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As mentioned above, the total amount of capital investment used in the tradable sector 
is imported from abroad and families do not consume imported goods. Thus, the last 
equation can be written as: 
 
t t t tC G X Y    
 
In order to satisfy external demand, the share of tradable production supplied to this 
market will define the total level of exports: 
 
(1 ) T Tt t t tX S P Y    
 
Therefore, the rest of net internal production (tradable, non tradable and informal) will 
be devoted to private and public consumption as well as internal investment. 
 
(1 )((1 ) )NT T T NT It t t t t t t tC G I S P Y Y Y         
 
If we add up aggregate demand, the balance of payments and the government budget 
constraint, we arrive at the equilibrium condition which states that internal and external 
savings should be equal.   
 
( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t tX M Y C I G          [ 30.] 
 
5. Export prices 
 
The main external shock will be modeled as a collapse in export prices. Thus, we model 
them as a first order autoregressive process AR(1). 
 
1log (1 )log log
SST T T
t t t tP P P         [ 31.] 
 
where t  is a normally distributed noise with zero mean and constant variance. 
Parameters were estimated using annual data from 1950-2008. The estimated value of 
the autoregressive parameter was 0.9.  
 
6. Bonds stationarity condition  
 
As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002), open economy models with 
incomplete asset markets are characterized by a steady state that depends on initial 
conditions and a dynamic equilibrium with a random walk
21
 component; i.e. including 
bonds (debt) in these models generates non stationarity. This could be easily verified 
introducing a shock that modifies the steady state level of net exports in the steady state 
equation for bonds or equation (30) above. 
  
A temporary –a single period- shock in time t that modifies the level of net exports in 
steady state will change the level of debt in steady state. In period t+1, net exports will 
                                                 
21
 This is the typical behavior of a non stationary variable. 
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return to its steady state level which, in turn, should move debt to its steady state values. 
However, this does not happen if we consider the following equation: 
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 [ 32.] 
 
In this way, any stationary shock drives bonds (debt) into a non stationary variable. 
Following the proposed methodology by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) we introduce 
an adjustment rule to the interest rate paid by bonds in such a way that ensures the 
existence of a steady state solution. We use a model with an interest rate that is elastic to 
the level of outstanding debt following the rule: 
 
            1, ( 1)
tB B
b tr r e
          [ 33.] 
 
where r represent the risk-free rate and 1( 1)t
B B
e    stands as the risk premium that 
the country has to pay for steering away from its steady state level of indebtedness. 
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Appendix 2: Simulating policy changes within the model 
 
The following steps are required to obtain impulse response functions for the main 
aggregate variables of the model after a stochastic shock is introduced. 
 
(i) Guarantee that the model is correctly closed, with a number of variables 
equal to the number of equations. 
 
(ii) Calibrate the model deep parameters (see table below). Some of them were 
obtained from the literature and others were estimated econometrically using 
Peruvian data. 
 
(iii) Obtain the steady state values for the variable levels. If the model has a 
steady state growth rate different than zero, it is necessary to scale all the 
variables using this rate in order to work with stationary variables.  
 
(iv) Solve the stochastic model in order to obtain policy functions for the 
relevant variables. In this case, we used a numerical method proposed by 
Blanchard y Kahn (1980) in which endogenous variables can be expressed as 
a lineal function of the predetermined state variables, deep parameters, and 
exogenous shocks. 
 
(v) Finally, we can simulate an array of policies introducing stochastic shocks 
into the policy functions of the policy variables. Shocks will transpire within 
the system of equations, generating the responses in the variables of the 
model.   
 
We can introduce two types of shocks in the level of the policy variables: transitory and 
permanent.  If the shock is transitory, it will provoke deviations of the variable levels 
from their steady states values and, thus, deviations of its growth rate from its steady 
state growth. However, after some time both (levels and growth rates) will return to 
their steady state values.  
 
If the shock is permanent, some variables will change its steady state values, and the 
simulation will allow us to assess the transition of the variable level from the initial 
steady state to the new one. This type of shock will generate a deviation of growth rates 
from their steady states but only for a limited time.  
 
To introduce policy changes we model our policy parameters (extra labor cost, and 
productivity parameter) as first order autoregressive processes: 
 
, , 1 ,log (1 )log log
SS
L t L L L L t L t          
 
1 ,log (1 )log log
SS
t A A t A tA A A       
 
Where ,L t   and  ,A t  are normally distributed noises with zero mean and constant 
variance. Parameters L  and A , on the other hand, represent the “memory” of the 
shocks. The value for these parameters depends on the type of shock that we are 
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simulating. For a transitory shock we assume a parameter of 0.5 and for a permanent 
shock we assume a parameter near to 1. 
 
In all policy evaluations based on model simulations the researcher is forced to match 
policy variables as parameters or variables within the model. The table below 
summarizes the policy options discussed in the main text and its proposed 
representation in terms of our model. 
 
 
Policy options 
Type of shock 
Transitory Permanent 
Business cycle dependent:   
Job protection: temporary payroll tax 
holiday 
Labor tax: L  -.- 
Worker protection: training for 
dislocated workers 
Total factor 
productivity: 
,NT TA A  
-.- 
Business cycle independent:   
Labor market regulation: reduce non-
wage labor costs 
-.- Labor tax: L  
Productivity enhancement training -.- 
Total factor 
productivity: 
,NT TA A  
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Calibration of Deep Parameters of the Model 
Parameters Definition Values Explanation Source 
  Intertemporal discount 
factor 
0.95 Implies an annual real interest rate 
of 5.2%. 
Montoro et al. 
(2007) 
  Intertemporal Consumption 
elasticity 
1 Required to have a balanced 
equilibrium path. 
King, Plosser  y 
Rebelo (1988) 
  Parameter of leisure 
satiation 
1 This is the value used in the RBC 
literature 
Montoro el al. 
(2007) 
  Income tax rate 0.07 Average of Tax Receipts over GDP 
in Peru 2008 
Sunat 
l  Labor extra cost 0.3 Labor extra cost Jaramillo 
K  Capital goods import tariff 0.0 Capital goods import tariff 
Instituto Peruana 
de Economía 
(IPE) 
  Depreciation rate 0.1 Implies a 10% annual depreciation 
rate 
Montoro et al. 
(2007) 
  Share of capital in tradable 
output 
0.4 Implies a share of 40% in total 
output 
Own estimates 
  Share of capital in non 
tradable output 
0.2 
Implies that the non tradable sector 
is less capital intensive than the 
tradable sector. 
 
  Interest rate elasticity to size 
of debt 
0.02  
Schmitt - Grohe y 
Uribe (2002) 
  Share of tradable production 
addressed to the foreign 
demand 
0.5 Share of tradable production 
addressed to the foreign demand 
BCRP 
I
SS
SS
L
L
 Share of informal workers 
in total workforce 
0.5 Share of informal workers in total 
workforce 
Saavedra and 
Nakasone (2003). 
GRADE 
T
SS
SS
Y
Y
 Share of tradable output in 
total GDP  
0.35 Share of tradable output in total 
GDP 
BCRP 
I
SS
SS
Y
Y
 Share of informal output in 
total GDP 
0.27 Share of informal output in total 
GDP.  
De la Roca and 
Hernández (2003.) 
GRADE 
 
Steady state values 
Steady state ratios Definition Values 
YI
Y
 
Share of Informal GDP 
27% 
X
Y
 Share of Exports in GDP 15% 
C
Y
 Share of Consumption in GDP 65% 
G
Y
 
Share of Government 
Consumption in GDP 
15% 
Deficit
Y
 Deficit as share of GDP 1% 
LI
L
 
Share of workforce as informal 
workers 
50% 
 
